Africa-EU relations have been formalised since the early post-independence period through various agreements between the European Union (and its predecessor, the European Economic Community) and African countries. These include the Lomé Convention (1975-2000), the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020) and the most recent Samoa Agreement, which has been in effect since 2023. The earlier agreements mainly covered trade and development in the relations between Europe and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The priority areas of the Samoa agreement reflect contemporary issues such as unprecedented climate change, peace and security, migration, and human and economic development.
The Africa-EU partnership has taken different forms over the years. There is the above-mentioned Africa-EU partnership in the context of the ACP-EU partnership, the AU-EU partnership between the two organisations, and other forms of Africa-EU relations in which the African Union (AU) is not the representative of the ‘Africa’ side. This is explained through the engagements of the two regions in trade and general diplomatic relations. In trade, the EU has pursued Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with various regions and individual countries in Africa. The EPAs aim to open the EU market fully and African markets partially over a defined transition period. Diplomatic relations between Africa and the EU have increasingly taken the form of continent-continent relations, exemplified by the AU-EU Summits and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES).
In recent years, the AU has taken a more active role in the continent’s global relations. Even EU leaders have recognised this and sought to forge stronger relations with the continental body, as signified by the European Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, immediately after taking the position in 2019. Also noteworthy are the visits by the EU Council President Charles Michel and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borell.
The EU is one of the most influential economic powers in the world. It is economically well-suited to engage with African countries and the AU to support development in the continent. The EU has made clear its intention to do this through various official documents over the years. The latest of these is the Joint Vision for 2030 by the AU and the EU. This vision symbolised a “renewed partnership” in Africa-EU relations, with the AU taking a significant role as the entity representing African states.
The Joint Vision has four main deliverables, which are: the EUR 150 billion Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package, cooperation on peace and security, on migration and mobility, and a commitment to “multilateralism within the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core”. So, how are the AU and EU prepared for the successful implementation of the Joint Vision for 2030?
The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: a summary
Priorities of the Africa-EU partnership have been identified several times in the last two decades. First, the EU’s 2005 Africa Strategy drew criticism for its lack of African input. This was quickly replaced by the first joint strategy in 2007, the JAES, which included input from the African side. The priorities of the JAES went beyond development cooperation, which had become a common feature of Africa-EU relations, and recognised the need for partnership in the political sphere. Other important highlights were the Millennium Development Goals targeted for 2015, the promotion of peace and security, and the strengthening of multilateralism to address common challenges.
The 2022 Joint Vision for 2030 picked up some of the priorities of the JAES. These include the focus on peace and security and multilateralism. The Joint Vision for 2030 also noted that the two organisations “will work together to promote effective multilateralism within the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core”.
The Joint Vision for 2030 was published at the end of the 6th EU-AU Summit in mid-February 2022. This is an interesting time because shortly after, Russia invaded Ukraine. In the March 2022 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) vote to condemn Russia for the invasion, almost half of all African countries in the UN did not vote to support the resolution. There are several reasons why these African countries abstained or did not vote at all. Still, it is clear that the UNGA vote worsened the Africa-EU relations, which were already fragile at the time of the Summit due to the EU’s failed vaccine diplomacy.
Contemporary global and regional developments drive priorities of the Africa-EU relations. The wording has changed, but the priorities have stayed the same. For example, both migration and climate change are included in the Joint Vision for 2030 and the JAES. Peace and security are also priorities in each document. While the Joint Vision for 2030 does not explicitly mention the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as the JAES mentioned the MDGs, the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package will work towards a number of SDGs, including SDG 3 (good health and well-being), SDG 4 (quality education), SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), and SDG 13 (climate action).
If implemented correctly, the Joint Vision for 2030 can support the priorities of the AU’s Agenda 2063. Some of Agenda 2063’s priorities that are aligned with the deliverables of the Joint Vision for 2030 are inclusive growth and sustainable development, a peaceful and secure continent, a people-driven development that actively engages the youth and women, and the positioning of Africa as a global player. Regarding the latter, one of the clear common objectives of both documents is reforming the UN Security Council to create a permanent seat representing Africa. These similarities between the Joint Vision for 2030 and the Agenda 2063 truly show that both sides developed this Agenda and that there is common ground to build a strong partnership.
The institutions
This part briefly looks at the institutions in place in the AU and the EU tasked with addressing each deliverable of the Joint Vision for 2030.
Global Gateway: Africa-Europe Investment Package
The Africa-Europe Investment Package is a EUR 150 billion plan of the Global Gateway, an EU connectivity strategy. As highlighted in the previous section, the investment package will impact several sectors in the African continent. Its delivery will be through a Team Europe approach, which includes the EU, its Member States and its institutions, such as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
For an ambitious undertaking such as the Africa-Europe Investment Package, the EU has the right institutions for its implementation. Direct involvement of Member States under the Team Europe umbrella will also add efficiency to the projects. However, it has been noted in multiple occasions that the Global Gateway, and therefore the Africa-Europe Investment Package, is simply a rebrand and repackaging of existing EU projects. This is mainly due to a lack of transparency regarding critical details of the Global Gateway, making some believe that it was simply a reaction to China’s own connectivity strategy – the Belt and Road Initiative – whose projects are very visible in several African countries, e.g., EAC countries. The Global Gateway is backed by key EU institutions making it a strong proposition. Still, the accusations of rebranding and the lack of sufficient details reflect a critical failure of the European Commission to be innovative and provide a new vision for development cooperation with African countries.
Peace and Security
As known, one of the biggest challenges facing the African continent is insecurity. The African Union has worked closely with the EU towards peace and security. The EU is deeply involved in the African Peace and Security Architecture by providing significant financial support to the African Peace Facility. Since 2021, the EU has acted under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which finances EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations in Africa and other places such as Ukraine. Some of the active EPF military operations in Africa include training missions in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique).
In the EU’s newer approach through the EPF, it is said that the AU has been sidelined from EU peace and security decision-making in contrast to how the African Peace Facility operated.
The AU’s own peace and security initiatives have proven difficult to implement. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the AU’s “blueprint for the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa ,” remains underdeveloped to deal with the multiple security crises faced by several countries and regions on the continent. A report by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) details institutional weaknesses in the AU, such as unclear role specifications in dealing with security issues. For example, there was confusion regarding the responsible spokesperson in the situation in Sudan. The report argues for strengthening the Panel of the Wise to “pre-emptively address emerging crises” as one measure to improve the APSA and its effectiveness.
Because the APSA is mentioned in the Joint Vision for 2030, its effectiveness is crucial for the vision’s success. It must, therefore, be reviewed and properly funded to ensure a stable trajectory for peace and security in the continent for the Joint Vision and the Agenda 2063.
Migration and Mobility
The migration issue is directly connected to peace and security, and development. Many Africans find themselves in insecure situations or extremely difficult economic conditions, forcing them to leave in search of more stable and secure lives. Together with the UN, the EU and the AU engage in a task force to address the migration of asylum seekers and other vulnerable groups departing from Libya to EU territory. The EU has sought to reduce irregular migration from Africa to the EU through the Mediterranean by setting up agreements with individual African states, including North African states and others within the common migrant routes, such as Niger and Mauritania. EU agreements for “migrant control” have received a lot of criticism because of reports that they enable EU-funded human rights abuses to be perpetrated against migrants. In this case, both sides of the Africa-EU partnership violate the principle of protecting human rights, undermining the Joint Vision. As sustainable structures to address migration are not in place, it is clear that the Africa-EU partnership is underdeveloped for this deliverable. However, better implementation of the peace and security deliverable could significantly help address migration as the need to flee conflict zones will be reduced.
Multilateralism
Finally, the Joint Vision for 2030 committed the AU and the EU to multilateralism. The vision to “promote effective multilateralism within the rules-based international order” was effectively undermined following the UNGA vote to condemn Russia in March 2022, which happened shortly after the conclusion of the EU-AU Summit. The situation where nearly half of all African countries did not vote for a resolution to condemn Russia for invading Ukraine, a sovereign state, made it clear that the rules-based international order is not a priority contrary to what is included in the Joint Vision for 2030. With such a situation, it is unclear what could be done to restore the multilateralism spirit in the context of the Joint Vision’s deliverables. The next EU-AU Summit between the European Council and the African Union Assembly could provide the answers, but for now, the damage has been done and it is likely that the Joint Vision is seen by some actors as just another document.
Conclusion
Following this short analysis of the existing arrangements for the implementation of the Joint Vision for 2030, it is evident that the EU is better prepared to implement the Joint Vision for 2030 in comparison to the AU. The EU has the institutions it needs to address the Joint Vision’s deliverables, however some need to be reformed to enable more African input and involvement. The EU also has significantly more financial capabilities, together with its Member States. This allows it to fund numerous projects in line with the Joint Vision. The AU suffers from underdeveloped institutions which undermine its ability to work towards many of the Joint Vision’s goals and its own priorities. African governments should commit more to the AU, financially and politically, in order to make it well-equipped for a continent-continent partnership. Institutional reforms of the AU, especially the APSA, are also necessary.
Although this essay touches on pressing issues in the Africa-EU partnership, it should be noted that there are challenges beyond the AU-EU framework that undermine cooperation. In this case, the challenge of alternative economic and security partners for African countries, who do not share the EU’s values, could be explored in a longer article. Many challenges exist in the EU-AU strategic partnership, but equally, there are many opportunities. If both sides can find the political will to improve on the issues highlighted in this essay, the AU-EU partnership can effectively work towards some of the Joint Vision’s deliverables and achieve positive and tangible outcomes.
The Afropolitan 